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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATF OF UTAH 
DAVID R. II'ILLIAMS, dba 
INDUSTRIAL CO}!l\ILJNIC/\TIONS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
HYRUM GIBBONS & SONS CO., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
NORTH UTAH COMMUNITY T.V., 
a Utah corporation, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 16,024 
JOINT BRIEF OF DEFENDANT- INTERVENOR 
RESPONDENTS AND CR0SS /\PPHLANTS 
NATURE OF THF CASE 
The Defendant-Intervenor Respondents (Respondents hereafter) 
agree with the ~ppellant's statement of the Nature of the Case. 
DISPOSITION H! L01,\TR COURT 
The lower Court held that Appellant had the statutory 
power of eminent domain, but denied Appellant's right to have 
the particulai site in question condemned based on its findings 
that: 
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"8. This particular site raises the 
likelihood that its installation would ser-
iously interfere with the reception of sev-
eral thousand television sets, which include 
television sets within the proposed subdivision 
within a distance of one-half mile. 
10. The taking of this particular site 
is not necessary to the public use of !'let in-
tiff where there are other satisfactorY alter-
na~ive sites that would meet the same ~onditiuns 
and in which the plaintiff would not run any 
risk of interference with other public use 
facilities." (F-130) 
THE NATPRF C~F RELIEF SOlJC;IIT ON i\l'Jll'.'\1. 
These Responuer- have the Lower Court's determin-
ations affirmed on alj ma-r:ters with the exception of one and 
by way of cross-appeal seek to have this Court reverse the 
Lower Court with respect to its Finding t 1u. S to the effect 
that the Appellant was authorized as a private company to 
exercise the powers of eminent domain and that the use to which 
the property sought to be condemned is to be applied by the Appel-
lant, is a use authorized b;· law under conLli t ions precedent to 
taking as provided by Section 78-34-4, UCA, 1953, and that 
Section 78-34-8 UCA, 1958 (sic) (78- 34-l(SIJ, 
of condemnation to the Appellant. (l·-12c') 
STATEMFNT Or FACTS 
l. The Defendant agrees with the Statcn,r·nt uf Facts as 
contained in paragraphs l, 2, and 3 ol Appellant's Brief. 
2. The particular site sought to he condemned by Appel-
lant is located in the middle of a prupusecl rf'sidc,ntial sub 
- 2 
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division which is on the hillside in the southeast section 
of Logan, Utah. (See Defendant's Exhibit No. 2.) The Appellant's 
expert witness on value testified that the highest and best 
use of the property was residential and is legally developable 
as residential in Logan City. (See Transcript, hereinafter 
referred to as "T", T. p. 175, lines 20-25.) 
3. The Complaint was filed on April 6, 1976 (See file, 
hereinafter referred to as "F," F-1) and the Answer was filed 
on April IS, 1976 (1-11) and a Motion for Immediate Occupany 
1vas filed on ~lay 20, 1976 (F-13) and the Defendant filed a 
Motion For Summary Judgment on ~lay 28, 1976 (1'-23) and on 
September 9, 1976, the Court entered an Order (F-57 to 58), 
which reads as follows: 
"1. That plaintiff operates a common carrier 
mobile radio telephone communications business regu-
lated as a public utility which is within the meaning 
of "telephone line" in Section 78-34-l (8), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), as Supplemented by Section 54-2-l 
(21) Utah Code Annotated (195.)). 
2. That Plaintiff has the power of eminent 
domain under said statute. 
3. That the Court reserves for trial as an 
issue of fact whether the particular site to be 
condemned is necessary to the public purpose of 
plaintiff, and the value of the property." 
4. On September l, 19-(•, IntervC'ncr filed a ~lotion to 
Intervene (F-43-44] and on September 28, 1~76 the Court 
granted Intervenor the right to int~rvene in the case. 
(F.S9) The Court stated its rC>asoning as follows: 
- _) -
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"One of the issues the Court reserved for 
trial was an issue of fact as to whether T!II S 
PARTICULAR SITE to be condemned is necessary to 
the public purpose of the Plaintiff. Also 
implicit in this reservation is as to whether 
there are other sites that exists that may serve 
the same purpose or whether this particular site 
is necessary for the public purpose of the Plain-
IT££. Therefore, the Court grants the motion to 
intervene ... not on the grounds of the proximity 
of the movants receiving stations but on the 
grounds that they have a valid interest in the 
determination of whether this particular site is 
necessary for the public purposes of the Plaintiff. 
(F. 59)" 
5. At the start vf the trial on May 2, 1978, discussion 
between counsel ~~- : ·Jrt took place defining the issues. 
The court then statec. (T-p. 6, lines 12-18.) 
"Now I would assume that they [Fespondcnts] can 
show in making a determination of whether this 
particular site is necessary for the public pur-
poses of the Plaintiff and also in balancing 
the public purposes of the Plaintiff, what it 
may do to interfere or disrupt or in other words 
other public purposes of which they apparently 
serve. I think it goes to the issue of public 
purpose." 
Through all of the events set forth in Paragraphs 3 and 4 above, 
and this Paragraph 5, Appellant made no objection to the court's 
proceeding along these lines. 
6. The case was then tried and Fngi necr Boyd Humphreys 
testified for Defendants and stated that he has had over 30 
years of experience in radio and electronics 111 \'arious capacities 
and that at the present time he is tlw L·hiel cn~·.cinccr <>i the 
radio facility at Utah St<~te Universit)'· (T-~:;o, lines l-b) 
- 4 
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Mr. Humphreys stated he had made a study of the proposed transmis-
sion site of Plaintiff, (T-230, lines ll-15.) and that a radio 
transmitter creates frequency interference caused by overload 
due to severe RF--or overload due to close proximity of transmis-
sion source to the reception devices which people living in 
a residential area normally have in their homes such as TV, 
stereo, hi-fi, and tape recorder. (T-232-233), lines 22-25, 
1-6.) These home receivers are also affected by harmonic radi-
ation. (T-230-231, lines 25, l-3.) 
Mr. Ilumphreys then discussed some of the attendant problems 
when TV sets are in a close proximity to a transmission facility 
and stated that Appellant's paging frequency falls within the 
IF pass band of 44 megacycles of the TV sets. (T.233, lines 
19-25 and T.234, lines 1-12, 24-25, T.235, lines l-25, T.236, 
lines 1-3.) That there is nothing a homeowner close enough 
to a transmitter can do to block out this interference. (T-
237, lines 1-3, T. 243-244, lines 21-25, 1-13.) Mr. Humphreys 
stated that he would expect some sort of interference up to 
1/2 mile surrounding the transmitter site. (T-240, lines 17-
21.) He discusses at length (T-241-243) how this interference 
manifests itself within this area. Mr. Humphreys stated that it 
is not necessary to have actual experience with Appellant's equip-
ment and all he needs to know is the power output capacity and 
frequency and that will tell him the interference capability. 
- 5 -
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(_T-240, lines 1-.3.) lie stCltcJ that the l·TC is concerned about 
these problems, but that it can be very expensive to overcome 
them for the ordinary homeowner, (T-24.), lines l-25.) 
Mr. Humphreys stated that Logan and Cache Valley are in a 
fringe area for TV reception and the TV sets here are much more 
susceptible to interference that would manifest itself in Logan 
and not manifest itself in Ogden, Salt Lake and Provo areas 
because these areas are in a Class A service area. (T-246-248.) 
Mr. Humphreys stated that moving the proposed transmitter site 
to the focth1.l .; T':c_·(clllately 1 mile east or the proposed site 
and further up the hill would be of no consequence as to the 
effectiveness of Appellant's system, and in fact the move of 
one mile coupled with a gain in elevation would be compensa-
ting for the reduction in field strength. (T-250, lines 8-12.) 
He then testified that he had examined other sites or areas of 
Logan for possible transmitter sites for Appellant's proposed 
uses, and that in his opinion there were other sites eas~ and 
west of Logan that may yield as good or better fulfillment of 
Appellant's system (T-250, lines 13-17, T-252, lines 7-17.) 
Mr. Humphreys concluded by stating that he would not con-
sider putting a transmitter facility such as Appellant's in the 
middle of a proposed subdivision and that on a scale or 0 to 10 
with 0 being the lowest degree of probability, the possibility 
that the legal emissions at Appellant's 1 icensed frequency from 
- 6 
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the site proposed by Appellants w.ould interfere with TV sets 
within a 1/2 mile radius would be 8 to 10 on said scale. 9T-
256, lines 3-8, T-259 1 line 3.) 
7. The engineers for the Appelant testified that they did 
not make any tests to determine site location as it was illegal 
to do so under FCC regulations. (See T-114, line 24 and T-152-
153, lines 23-12.) Appellant's site selection was purely sub-
jective. (See T-153, lines 11-22.) Mr. Williams the owner 
of the Appellant testified that they had not explored for 
alternative sites (See T-62, lines 18-22.) 
8. Mr. William Fletcher, Associate Professor of Electron-
ics at USU who had been a consultant in the area of interference 
and transmission and made detailed studies for site locations 
for transmitter and receiver locations then testified for Respon-
dents. (See T-282, lines 13-23, T-283-284.) He testified that one 
could legally run tests in the valley with a fifty megacycle tran-
mitter, which could be a great value in site location. (See 
T-289. lines 13-25.) ~lr. Fletcher then discussed alternative 
sites around Logan (See T-289-291.) and he then states that 
there is more than one alternative site out there. (See T-291, 
lines 10-12.) ~ir. Fletcher was then asked as follows: 
(T-291, line 21 to 292, line 11.) 
"Q If you were to locate a site for a . 
transmission facility of up to 500 watt capacrty 
would you consider that site in a proposed sub-
division area? 
- 7 -
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A That would be a function of the rrc-
quency at which I_was transmitting. J think 
I wouldn't mind--1f 1t were two MI-l or scllnc-
thing like that I don't suppose l would feel 
too bad about. 
Q Let me ask you at 4.3 ~![!. 
A I would consider that dangerous. 
Q Why do you say that would be dangerous. 
A The mere fact that I know what Boyd is 
talking about, I have also heard testimony 
where when the police operated in that 
same band h·· : <•eked out television 
signals. T _,u-•: , __ ,u-ldn't want to subject 
myself to a :aws~~t. I would move some 
place. Now that's purely my own instinct 
of self-suvival." 
9. The site sought to be condemned by Appellant is right 
next door to the site of the Interventor's head-end receiving 
facility for its cable TV system (See Defendant's Exhibit No. 
1.) Mr. Boyd Humpherys was called by 1\!r. Hoggan and questioned 
as to possible interference problems between a transmitter 
of Appellant's specifications and the cable TV receivers. 
Mr. Humphreys stated that channel 6 out o[ Pocatello comes 
to Cache Valley and that to his knowledge the cable TV's receiving 
facility is the only one in Utah receiving said station. (See 
T 315, lines 4-13.) Mr. Humphreys said he would be concerned 
about the harmonic energy or spurious emissions that would 
cause problems particularly with channel 6 because the second 
harmonic energy coming out of Appellant's transmitter at its 
- 8 -
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proposed broadcasting fr~quency would [all directly within 
the channel 6 pass band. (See T-.315, line 19 to 319, line 17.) 
lie said that he would see it as a serious problem. (See T 316, 
lines 13 to 14.) Mr. Hoggan then asked the following question: 
(T 320, line 12.) 
"Q Now if I were to ask you to rate the 
probability that there would be interference by 
the Plaintiff's tranSTilitter with Channel 6 on a 
scale of zero to ten, zero being the lowest and 
ten the highest, what would you say the probability 
would be that the plaintiff's transmitter would 
in fact interfere with Channel 6? 
~Tr. LLOYD: Objection. don't think 
there's a sufficient foundation or sufficient 
showing of knowledge of his experience with 
this ~quipment. He's been talking about 
500,000 watts versus the 350 watts. I just 
don't think he's qualified. 
"IR. ITOCGAN: I asked him if it was on 
the basis of the examination of the specifi-
cations for the plaintiff's equipment. 
THE C!lU!l.T: Overruled. 
Q You can answer the question. 
A. The probability would be very great. 
think the possibility under consideration 
I'd have to rate it between eight and ten, 
and could not be ignored." 
(Sec als" Defendant's J:xhibit :•!o. 6 that illustrates 
this testimony.) l'ir. llumphreys further stated that the only 
practical solution to th~ problems is physical separation 
(T-321, lin~ ~4.) 
10. ~lr. ~- 1, 1·d a; f c·d 'lr. JTUJnphrers about the FCC solving 
lJ 
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This problem is not resolved by the FCC. 
Q Is it your opinion that FCC will allow 
them to transmit and interrupt 4,000 homes' 
television? 
A They can't police individual actions, 
individual licensees. It's up to the licensees; 
only when they receive sufficient documentation 
showing that there is a difficulty then do they 
enter into the case. Fach case is judged on its 
c~n merit and each engineering staff should be 
able to work those details nut before the sit-
uation is completed." 
11. Attorney Hoggan then called ~illiam Fletcher as a 
witness as t' :t ~~ the Appellant's transmitter upon 
Interventor's r, ·sten" ~~r. Fletcher testified as follows: 
(T 331, lines 21 tc: 2~.) 
"If their transmitter goes into or close to 
saturation that harmonic content can just jump 
back, you know, up to twenty-five per cent. That 
could be catastrophic." 
He then stated that Appellant's frequency has a first har-
monic right in the center of Intervenor's Channel 6. Mr. 
Fletcher then described the effect that the second harmonic 
from Appellant's transmitter could have on Channel 6 in Logan 
as ranging from bringing just a woobly looking figure to completely 
garbled speech and distorted picture. (T-Y\2, line 10-1.1.) 
He then characterized the sir,nal from Channel (, as weak '"hen 
received by Intervenor's rPceiver and that such 1·:eakness grcatly 
increases the lilelihood of interference as t~e Tl 's receivers 
pick up the weal< primary signal (Channel (;) and the noise signal 
- 1 0 
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(second harmonic) and the automatic gain control activates, 
(upon reception of weak signals) and sends both into the cable 
system without distinction (T-332-333, lines 23-20.) 
!'.'hen asked what could be done, the follo\ving was stated: 
(T-332, lines 3-4, T-333, lines 21 to 24.) 
"Q What would be the surest way of guaran-
teeing that that kind of interference wouldn't 
occur? 
A The absolutely surest way, the gut 
sure way, is to move away. 
(T-334, line 25 to 335, line 12.) 
Q You heard the testimony of Mr. 
Humphreys as to the degree of probability 
rated on scale of from zero to ten, with 
zero being the lowest and ten the highest, 
that the first harmonic from the plaintiff's 
proposed transmitter would interfere with 
the plaintiff's (sic (Interveno's) Channel 6 
recption at its receiver site. Do you have 
an opinion as to the degree of probability 
that that interference would occur? Answer 
11 yesn or "no." 
A Yes, and I would like to qualify that. 
Q Okay. 
A I have two opinions. If you rate 
it on zero to ten as concern, I'd say it's 
ten. Okay? From an engineering back-
ground I would rate it much like Boyd--" 
Mr. Fletcher then stated that with a 350-watt transmitter, one 
is dealing with a second harmonic with a significantly greater 
signal than is being received on Channel 6 (T-335-336, lines 
25-2.) Finally, when asked if a transmitter could be shielded 
- ll -
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to block out this type of harmonics Professor Fletcher stated 
that in his experience there was all kind of trouble in doing 
this. (See T-339, line 4.) 
12. After hearing all of the evidence the Court on May 
10, 1978, issued its Memorandum Decision. (See F-113-115.) The 
Court made a finding: 
"· .. that there are several other alternative 
sites that would perform the service offered by the 
Plaintiff and that the fact that there are other 
alternative sites, everything being equal, would 
not defeat their right to condemn this particular 
site. Pe0~'F? · ~0t normally like to lose their 
land througt Je~.nat1on and to state simply 
because the~e ~s annther alternative site, that 
then thrusting the burden to some other owner, is 
not grounds to sar that the taking is not neces-
sary of this particular site to such use. How-
ever, the Court finds, that based upon the testi-
mony, this particular site raises the likelihood 
that its installation would seriously interfere 
with the reception of several thousand television 
sets. That the taking of this particular site 
is not necessary to this use where there are other 
satisfactory alternative sites that would meet 
the same conditions and in which you would 
not run any risk of interference with other 
public use facilities. (See F-114-115.)" 
13. The Court then made its Findings of Fact as follows: 
(F-130, para. 8-10.) 
"8. This particular site raises the 
likelihood that its installation would seriously 
interfere with the reception of several thousand 
television sets, which include television sets 
within the proposed subdivision within a distance 
of one-half mile. 
9. That intervenor owns and operates a 
cable ~elevision system in Logan, 1ltah and 
the adJacent communities of North Logan and 
- 12 -
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River Heights; that said cable system is 
operated under and by virtue of a Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity issued hy the 
Federal Communications Commission and 
franchises issued to the Intervenor bv the 
said cities of Logan, North Logan and. River 
Heights. That Intervenor provides cable TV 
services for approximately 4,000 homes and 
has invested in its cable system in excess 
of $800,00n.oo. The Court finds that the 
system operated by Intervenor is and the 
services provided by Intervenor are a public 
use. 
10. The taking of this particular site 
is not necessary to the public use of plaintiff 
where there are other satisfactory alternative 
sites that would meet the same conditions 
and in which the plaintiff would not run any 
risk of interference with other public use 
facilities." 
Whereupon, the Court entered its Judgment dismissing this action 
for the taking of this particular site. 
ARGUMfNT 
POINT I. THF LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT TN 
HOLDINC: THAT APPELLANT'S lUCHT TO CONfiH!N TI!IS 
PARTICULAR SITE SHOULD B[ DENIED BE!AliSF OF THE 
LIKF.LIH00D OF SERinU~ INTERFERENCE WTTf' DEFEN-
ANT'S AND INTERVENOR'S USE Of THEIR PROPERTY. 
Section 78-34-8 lJCA (1953) as amended states the power 
of the .Judge in Eminent Domain matters as follows: 
"POll'fRS OF COl'RT OR .Jl'DGE--The court or 
judge thereof shall have power: 
(ll To determine the conditions specified 
in Section 78-34-4 UCA (1953) ... 
(2) To hear and determine all adverse or 
conflicting claims to the property sought to 
he condemned and to the damages therefor ... " 
Section 78-34-4 provides as follows: 
- 13 -
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"CONDITIONS PRECI'DENT TO TAKING-- Before 
property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) That the use to which it is to be 
applied is a use authorized by law; 
(2) That the taking is necessary to such 
use; and, 
(3) If already appropriated to some 
public use, that the public use to which it 
is to be applied is a more necessary public use." 
The Lower Court held that 1\ppellant was authorized by 
law to exercise the right of eminent domain . l'efend:Jr:t c lai1ns 
. 1ddress this question hereafter in 
Point II. 
The Lower Court held that the taking of this particular 
site was not necessary for J'laintiff's use when other satisfactory 
alternative sites were available that would meet the c;ame con-
ditions and in which one would not run any ris~ of interference 
with other public use facilities. .A.dclitionally, in a very 
real sense, this property has already been appropriated to 
some public use inasmuch as the Lower rourt held that the lntcrven-
or who provides cable TV to over 4, 000 homes in Logan '' i th 
an investment of over $800,000.00 was also a public use as 
set forth in 78-34-4(3) \JC\ (1953) and \ppcllant'c; evidcnce 
failed to demonstrate that its proposed liSe is a 11!11Il' nec~ss:1ry 
pu b 1 i c us e . T h e A p p e l l an t [a i l e cl t " m c c t i t s lllJ r d r_· n n r p r L' o r 
inasmuch as the great perponderance of the C\'ic!ence in th1s ca~c 
supports the Court findings. In making this dccJsiun, the 
- 14 -
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Court was merely following the statutory mandate of the Legislature 
as set forth in 78-34-4 (1) and (2). 
As noteu above, judicial detenninati on of the facts in this 
particular case is authorized in 78-.\4-4 lJCA wherein it is stated 
that the nature of a use within the power of eminent domain is 
ultimately a judicial question. (See 26 JIJn. Jur. 2d p. 690 FN 
19.) The necessity for taking particular land such as in this 
case has been held to be a judicial question. (See 29 A CJS p. 
370.) Appellant, in its brief, cites the recent Utah case of 
Salt Lake Co. vs. Ramoselli, 567 P. 2d 182 (Utah, 1977). In this 
case Justice Hall of this Court wrote at page 183 the following: 
"1. The power of eminent duma in is not to 
be exercised thoughtlessly or arbitrarily and 
the courts possess full authority to determine 
the proper limits of the power to prevent 
abuses in its exercise and litigants should 
and do have great latitutde in conferring 
dispositive functions upon the court as 
they clearly did in this instance. 
2. The question of necessity of taking 
is the functional PEROGATIVE OF THE JUDICIAL 
SYSTHI and that principle of law is stated in 
Nichols on Eminent Domain as follows: 
'In every case therefore, 
there is a judicial question 
whether the taking is of such a 
nature that it is or may be founded 
on public necessity.' 
The trial court clearly recognized its duty to 
determine the issue o[ necessity and proceeded 
to take evidence on that sole issue pursuant 
to the stipulation of the parties." (Emphasis 
added.) 
- l 5 -
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Appellant, in its brief, cites many authorities in support 
of its position that are mentioned only in the dissent of Justice 
Ellet in the Ramoselli case. Said citations of ;\ppellant simply 
do not reflect the law in the State of Utah as set forth in the 
majority opinion in the same case. 
The posture of this case was very similar to that of the 
Ramoselli case at the time of trial. Appellant's position, at 
this point in time, that the trial court erred in taking evidence 
on and determinin~ th~ issue of the necessity of the proposed 
acquisition i~ r,,~ "1 ":-lLen. Appellant, itself, concedes 
that in a proper case, t~e Courts may consider whether the par-
ticular taking is necessary and cites the Ramoselli case and 
then turns around and quotes Nichols on Eminent Domain from the 
dissent in said case, to the effect that generally a Court may 
not inquire into the question whether there is any necessity 
for the taking or whether there is any need for the particular 
estate sought to be condemned. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13.) 
The Court's attention is directed to Respondents' statement 
of the Facts, Paragraphs 3, 4, and S, supra. Appellant herein, 
is in the same position as the Appellant in the Ramoselli case. One 
of Appellant's main contentions is that the trial court exceeded 
its authority of judicial review, despite the fact that at the 
time of trial, it readily recognized the rourt's authority to 
determine the issue of necessity of the proposed :1cqui:.;ition. 
- 16 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
No objection was interposed by Appellant to the Court's Order 
on the ~lotion for Summary Judgment ''herein said issue is reserved 
for trial. cr- 57)' or to the Court Is ~lemorandum Decision allow-
ing the Intervenor standing insofar as said issue is reserved 
for trial (F-59) or at the time of trial (T-3, lines 7-21.) 
In fact, as in the Ramosell~ case, the parties herein are to be 
viewed as having agreed and stipulated at the time to bifurcate 
the trial, separating the issue of entitlement to condemn from that 
of just compensation for the taking and reserving the latter issue 
for a subsequent hearing. (T-3, lines, 7-21, T-370, lines 11-
18, a statement by the Trial Court to which no objection was raised 
The law is well settled in this state that when a trial 
judge has resolved conflicting questions of fact, based on the 
evidence and made findings and entered its judgment, all of which 
are supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court will not 
interfer with the decision. (See Bountiful vs. Swift, 535 P. 
2d 1236 (Utah, 1975); Nuhn vs. Broadbent, 507 P. 2d 371 (Utah 
1973); Olson vs. Park Daughter, 511 P. 2nd 145 (Utah, 1973); 
Ramoselli, supra.) 
In Salt Lake Co. vs. Ramoselli, supra, at page 184, 
the majority of this court said as follows: 
"Plaintiff's challenge to the Judgment 
fails since the parties sought and stipulated 
for the decision and there is an abundance 
of admissible and competent substantial evidence 
to suppnrt the same. In accord with the numer-
ous pronouncements of this court, no attempt 
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should be made to substitute our Judgment for 
that of the trial Court." 
From the foregoing it is clear that inasmuch as the trial 
Court in this case had substantial evidence upon which to make 
its findings and decision, such decision should not he disturbed 
by this Court. 
The trial court did not err in finding there were several 
other alternative sites that would perform the service offered 
by Appellants. The trial court did not err in finding that 
this particular ~it ~j~ ! necessary to the public usc of 
Appellant given the f nJing as to alternative sites and the 
finding relative to the likelihood of interference with Re-
spondents' property. The evidence adduced at trial was 
sharply conflicting. Appellant's witnesses adamantly insisted 
that the particular site involved is the only one that is econ-
omically feasible. Yet both of Appellant's expert witnesses 
testified on cross-examination that their selection of this site 
was a subjective determination of their part. cr. 115, lines 
21-23, T. 153, lines 13-22.) Both of Respondents' expert wit-
nesses stated that they felt, after examining the environs around 
Logan, that there were other, equally or perhaps more useful 
sites available, which would not involve the same dangers of 
interference they foresaw as being associated with this site. 
(T.250, lines 13-17, T.252, lines 7-17, T.2C1l, lines J0-12.) 
Respondents' experts further testified to all the matters set 
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forth in the Statement of Facts herein, Paragraphs 6 to 11. 
Plaintiff at page 16 of its brief states that there was 
no evidence that Appellants' system ever caused--interference--
yet, Mr. Williams, owner of the Plaintiff, testified at (T-70, 
line 23.) as follows: 
"V1e have had two interference problems to 
my knowledge in the operation period of our 
company." 
Appellant claims to have corrected these problems, but 
both were in a primary receiving area or a Class-A TV service 
area. In this connection, Boyd Humphreys testified at (T-
247, line 2 to 6.) as follows: 
"Those interferring signals may be present 
in Salt Lake, although much less amplitude, but, 
however, being in the class A service area the 
set ignores them. But when your're in a marginal 
and fringe area, those problems become very 
important." 
He went on to say that spurious emissions of Appellant's 
equipment that might not manifest themselves in such a Class-A 
service area, may well do so in a fringe area such as Cache 
Valley. (T-248, lines 3-19.) 
While it is true that neither of Respondents' expert witnes-
ses had experience with Appellant's particular equipment or performec 
any tests with it, they were both well-trained men in their field 
and trained to anticipate and predict what performance to expect 
from certain equipment with specifications that are based upon 
and tied to well-known standards. By the same token, it should 
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be recognized that Appellant~ experts admitted never having 
performed actual objective tests in Cache Valley, and there is 
no evidence that Appellant's equipment would not cause the 
interference predicted by Respondents' witnesses in the different 
setting of Cache Valley. Respondents' witnesses would certainly 
be the better qualified to testify with respect to this aspect 
of the problem and are disinterested third p;11·tie:-; looL ing at the 
situation. 
Finally, Appellants' own witnesses testified on cross-examina-
tion that the Appellac: l" ,~, "t ,nnry transmitter sites varying in 
distance from seven to :~cnt~-(1\" miles from the targeted usc 
area. T1'0 primary sites are seven and :-;eventCl'll n•ilcs from 
Vernal, Utah, one is 80 miles from Duchesne, Utah, one is three 
to four miles from Coalville, Utah, one is thirteen n1i1es from 
Park City, Utah and one is 25 miles fr·om ~·organ, litah. ('!'. 116, 
lines l-4, 12-13, T. 117, lines 9-ll, T. 118, lines 7-10.) These 
are all areas with fewer inhabitants than Cache Valley and wl1ilc 
Appellant claims the building structures in at least Park City 
are different, (T. 122, lines 13-17), and that much or the ser-
vice in these areas deals with mobile telephones with outside 
antenna, Appellant does admit that they have paging services in 
at least Vernal and in Park City and that the distance from the 
proposed site to downto1,11 Logan is approxiJnat;cly a mile to a 
mile and a half. (T. 119 -120, lines 25-2, T. 121, lines l-3, 
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13-19.) 
Given the foregoing, it see~ evident to Respondents that 
the trial court's decision is very well couched in an abundance 
of admissible, competent and substantial evidence to support 
the same, and this Court should not substitute its judgment 
therefor. 
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT f'RRF.D D! DETJ:R-
~HNING THI\T APPr:LLANT, AS A PUBLIC UTILITY, HAD 
THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. 
Respondents assert that the trial court erred in allowing 
the Appellant, a private public utility, to proceed with eminent 
domain. (F-25 to 27.) 
The Constitution of the State o[ lltah, Article I, Section 
22, provides that private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation. 
Section 78-34-1(8) of the UCA provides uses for which 
the ~ight of eminent domain may be exercised as follows: 
"A. Subject to the provisions of this 
Chapter the right of eminent domain may be 
exercised in behalf of the following public 
uses: ... (8) Telegraph, telephone, electric 
light and electric power lines, and sites for 
electric light and power plants. (emphasis 
added.) 
It will be noted that in the provisions of the above 
stated Statute, it does not give the right to a private public 
utility such as Appellant, with its telephonic services, to 
condemn property for the location of transmitter facilities or 
"plants," but that there is contained in said Statute speci-
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fie authority to condemn property for installation of telephone, 
telegraph, and electric power lines. (See 78-34-l (8), supra.) 
Nothing therein gives the right to condemn potential sites for 
the purpose of radio transmission plants or sites. 
The undersigned can find nothing in Section 54-3-l et. seq. 
that grants the power of eminent domain to ~my ''public utili-
ties" and therefore the provisions of Section 78-34-l a)Jparently 
contain the sole legislative authorization with respect to the 
exercise of said po11'C'1 :.1- 1 •· r{ provisions should be read as 
limiting and restricting ~~· r~~ht to condemn in behalf of only 
those specific public Lses as defined in said statute. 
Respondents recognize that perhaps the Legislature could 
have authorized and provided the right of eminent domain in 
behalf of other public uses not listed in said Section 78-34-l, 
but in Utah, the Legislature has not seen fit to do so. The right 
to condemn property as a "site" for a particular activity is 
mentioned several times in said section, but not at all for a 
telephone or radio transmitter site. The State Legislature 
has granted the right to exercise the power of eminent domain 
to private, public utilities companies in cases of telephone 
and telegraph lines, not for transmission sites or plants as 
noted above. 
A second area the Respondents wish to draw to the Court's 
attention is addressed in 26 Am.Jur. 2d, page (J68, which pro-
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vides the following: 
"The general rule is that the exercise 
of the right of eminent domain that private 
property can be taken only for a public 
purpose or use. In other words, it is 
settled generally that private property 
cannot be taken for other than public 
use under any circumstances ... Nevertheless, 
while the courts have not been in agreement 
on the precise meaning of the term "public 
use" it has generally been held that the 
state does not have power to authorize 
the taking of the property of an individual 
without his consent for the private use of 
another; even on the payment of full 
compensation. The modern doctrine is that 
a taking for a private use is forbidden 
by implication by the constitutional pro-
vision especially applicable to eminent 
domain; and while implied prohibitions in 
the constitutions of the states are not 
favored, the rule against taking for 
private uses is so firmly established 
that it cannot be reasonably subjected to 
analysis in the light of mere canons of 
construction, and it is now well settled 
that the prohibition against taking of 
property for public use without just compen-
sation impliedly, but definitely forbids a 
taking of property for private uses." 
Ttmphas1s added.) 
At 26 Am. Jur. 2d page 684 it goes on to state: 
"It is a well-settled general principal 
that incidental benefits accruing to the 
public are not sufficient to make the purpose 
of improvement or enterprise a public one. 
Thus, where the chief, dominating purpose 
or use is private, the mere fact that a 
public use or benefit is also incidentally 
derived will not warrant the exercise of 
eminent domain. The property of an individual 
cannot, without his consent, be so devoted 
to the private use of another. The controlling 
question is whether paramount reason for the 
taking of land to which objection is made is 
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the public interest, to which_be~efits to 
private interests are merely 1nC1dental, or 
whether, on the other hand, the pr1vate 
interests are paramount and contro11 ing <1JHl 
the public interests merely incidental." 
At 26 Am. Jur. 2d page 686 it additionally states: 
"1\fh.ere there is a combined purpose, partly 
for public and partly for private use or benefit, 
and the two uses or purposes cannot be separated, 
eminent domain cannot be exercised. See footnote 
19 c1t1ng numerous cases." (Emphasis added.) 
The California case of Bauer vs. Ventura County, 289 
P. 2d l (.Calif. ~c.< .. " 1:1c'~ public use as follows: 
"Public usc- "itlnn the constitutiunZil provi· 
sian that private property shall not be taken 
or damaged for public use without just compensa· 
tion is a use concerning the whole community and 
legitimate objective of government." 
In connection with Section 78-.34-1 (8) and 54-2·1 et. sel[. 
there is no specific mention by the Legislature that radio-
telephone common carriers, or other business regulated by the 
Public Service Commission have the right to exercise the power 
of eminent domain. 
It seems to the Pespondents that the primary purpose of 
the definitions of "telephone line" and "telephone corporation," 
as set forth in the Public Utilities sections or 54·2·1 l2l) all<! 
54 . 2 - l ( 2 2) ' u c~ ' i s t 0 a i d i n s 8 tt i n g r () r t h t h '·' I' a I" a Jill' t e r s \;' i t h i 11 
ll1hich the regulatory statute set forth therein ts tn operate in ]Ho· 
viding a means lvhereb;· the .'itZite, throui:h the> f'uhlic- Son·icc> 
Conunission, can regulate tlwse that arc in the hthlllC'SS, inter 
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alia, of providing telephonic communications to the general 
public by the use of telephone. 
The case of r1innesota ~:icrowave Jnc. vs. Puhlic Service 
Con®ission, 190 NK 2d 661, 665 and 666, 291 Minnesota 241, 
is a case where a private company provided, under contract, 
unidirectional closed circuit microwave facilities for 
transmission of educational television signals involving 
no use of telephone poles, lines or equipment for trans-
mission furnished from point to point, although the suh-
scriber would have to use coaxial cables not owned nor 
supplied by the company to convey material transmitted 
to and from the terminals of the company system. It was 
held not to be a telephone company or supplier of a telephone 
service subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Commission. 
Section 54-3-8 is a provision stating there will be 
no discrimination in rates of a public utility. Section 
54-3-10 provides that the service of a telephone corporation 
will be given on a non-discrimination basis; and Section 
54-4-1 is not applicable and docs not give the right of con-
demnation to the Appellant, hut merely vests jurisdiction 
in the Public Service Commission to supervise and regulate 
the public utilities within the State. 
The exercise of the power of eminent domain in the taking 
of a private person's property is a very severe and drastic 
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remedy, and is strictly 1 imited to those areas that are speci-
fically set forth in the I:minent llomain Statute. This has 
not been followed in this case and unless the Appellant is 
clearly authorized by Statute to proceed as it desires, this 
Court should find in favor of the Respondents and reverse the 
trial count's determination that the Appellant has the authority, 
as a public utility, to exercise the power of eminent domain in 
corudemning this particular site for its radio-telephone trans-
mitter-receiYc' '~ ilities. 
PC1l~1T '~ .1 I . fl 't LO\\T R COURT CORRJ:CTL Y 
FOUND THE InTR\'E':ciJ;. Tl' HAVE STANDINC: TO 
CONTEST THE COMPLAINT OF APPELLANT. 
The purpose of the legal doctrine of intervention and the 
rationale behind it have been clearly stated in legal treatises 
and in courts across the country. 
In 59 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 552-3 it states: 
"The purpose of the procedure is to enable 
anyone having an interest in a subject of lit-
igation to interject himself into the case in 
timely season to protect his rights and to 
obviate delay and multiplicity of actions. 
- 26 -
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process." (Emphasis added) 
In People vs. Superior Court of Ventura County, 552 P. 2d 
760 (Calif., 1976) the Court said: 
"The intervention statute protects the 
interests of others affected by the judgment, 
obviating delay and multiplicity. 
In City of Delta vs. Thompson, 548 P. Zd 1292 (Colo., 
197 S), the Court said: 
"Rules as to right to intervene as a party 
in an action are to be liberally construed so 
that all related controversies may be settled 
in one action. 
In Utah, there are apparently two statutes to be considered 
with respect to the present action. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure deals speci(ically with intervention by parties 
in civil actions. Rule 24 provides as follows: 
"(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely 
application anyone shall be permitted to inter-
vene in an action: (3) when the applicant is so 
situated as to be adversely affected by a 
distribution or other disposition of prop-
erty which is in the custody or subject to 
the control or disposition of the court or 
an officer thereof. 
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon 
timely application anyone may be permitted 
to intervene in an action: ... (2) when an 
applicant's claim or defense and the main 
action have a question of law or fact in 
common ... In exercisiong its discretion the 
Court shall consider whether the interven-
tion will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of the rights of the original 
parties. 
Even without a liberal construction of the foregoing rule 
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as it should be applied in the present case, the Intervenor-
Respondent clearly falls within subsections "a (3)" and "b (2)" 
of Rule 24. The evidence set forth above clearly shows that 
the Intervenor-Respondent stands to be adversely affected in a 
very direct manner were the trial court or this court to dispose 
of the property subject to their control in favor of Appellant. 
By the same token, the same evidence clearly shows that both 
Respondents have questions of fact in conm1on between them. The 
bulk of testimony given on behalf of both respondents was given 
by the same two witnesses and was to the effect that the taking 
of the particular site requested by Appellant is not necessary 
to its public use because there are other equally or more suit-
able sites available and that both Respondents face the serious 
likelihood of direct interference with the highest and best use 
of their property. Certainly delay and a multiplicity of actions 
in the most appropriate and correct sense have been avoided by 
allowing Intervenor-Respondent to enter the defense of this action, 
such intervention has not unduly delayed or prejudiced the adjudi-
cation of the rights or the original parties. 
UCA. 
The second statute to be dealt with is found at 78-34-7, 
It states: 
"Who mat appear and defend. All persons 1n 
occupation o , or having or claiming an interest 
in, any of the property described in the complaint, 
or in the damages for the taking thereor, though 
not named, may appear, plead and defend, each in 
respect to his own property or interest, or that 
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claimed oy him, in the same manner as if named in 
the complaint. 
It does not appear to Respondents that this is to be read 
as as e.xclusive statement of the rights of parties to appear 
and defend in condemnation actions, but in [act, must be read 
in conjunction with Rule 24, Respondents see nothing unique in 
condemnation actions to remove them from the main stream of 
intervention in civil cases, especially in light of the laudable 
and necessary bases for the doctrine. 
The Appellant correctly points out that the Intervenor-
Respondent has no interest in the property at issue here in 
a fee simple sense. It cites two cases in support of its claim 
that in light of that fact, Intervenor-Respondent has no standing. 
In State vs. Tedesco, 286 P. 2d 785 (Utah, 1955), the facts are 
different than those of the present case and result in meaningful 
distinctions. The Appellant in that case was defending against 
and appealing an action by the State of Utah itself, which had 
raised the defense of sovereign immunity. Such is not the case 
herein. The Appellant in that case, after a rejection of his 
claim, could still proceed to fully use its land without the concerr 
of a material and continuing interference with such use by 
the condemnor. Such 1s not the case here. Contrary to the 
facts in that case, the facts here show that the Interveno~­
Respondent has a present, direct and real interest in the land 
sought to be condemned by the Appellant. 
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It should be noted that the trial court Lound in its 
MeJJwrandum Decision allowing intervention that the mot ion should 
be granted: 
'' ... on the grounds that they have a valid 
interest in the determination of whether this 
particular site is necessary for the publ~pur­
poses of the Plaintiff."(J-59) 
In the second case cited by Appellant, City of Louisville 
vs. Munro, 475 S.W. Zd 479 (Ky. 1971), the Appellant's own state-
ment of the case conto1ns the exception applicable to this case. 
A claim for damages ~· ulJ not be established in the absence of 
a showing of material interference with t~e ordinary physical 
comfort or reasonable use of the complaining neighbor's property. 
Such a material interference is precisely what Intervenor-
Respondent alleged and proved to the satisLactinn of the trial 
court as being the result of granting Appellant's request. 
In concluding this argument, it should be noted that 
Appellant raised an objection to the intervention of the cable 
television company by way of a Memorandum opposing such action 
filed with the trial court on September 7, 1976. (F-53) That is the 
last mention of any objection to Intervenor's presence until 
Appellant's Brief was filed with this court over two years later. 
Appellant's trial llemorandum does not renew the objection and 
in fact discusses Intervenor's defense in depth. (T-108) /\t 
the trial proper, the question h·as raised as to the issues 
being tried and the reasons for Intervenor's presence. (T. 
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2, line 7.) At no time did Appellant renew its objection. 
In light of all that has transpired since May 11, 1976, 
and in any event, Respondents submit that Appellants should 
be found to have waived any objection they may have to Inter-
venor's participation in this lawsuit and be estopped from 
now raising it. 
POINT IV. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY INDI-
CATED THAT IT IS MORE THAI\/ LIKFLY THAT THE 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT WILL SUFITR GPEAT AND 
IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IF THE TRANSMITTER 0F 
APPELLfu\IT IS INSTALLED ~~ITHIN THE MIDDLE OF 
ITS PROPOSED SUBDIVISION. 
Answering Point III of Appellant's brief, Resondents 
assert that it is clear from the evidence set forth above that 
the Respondents face a very high probability that they will 
suffer great and irreparable damage if the transmitter of Appel-
lant were installed within the middle of the Defendant-Respondent's 
proposed subdivision and immediately adjacent to Intervenor-
Respondent's cable TV receivers. Appellants own expert on 
the value of the property testified that the highest and best 
use thereof is residential and is legally developable in Logan 
City. (T. 175, lines 20-ZS.) l''r. Lloyd on cross examination 
asked Mr. Humphreys the following: (T 272, lines 10 - 22.) 
"(I Rut in fact it's conunon knowledge 
in your business, is it not, that two-way 
radio for business license similar to Mr. 
Wilcox or CB operators do omit harmonics 
and spurious emissions that cause problems 
all over the country. 
- 31 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A So do paging transmitters. 
Q Oh, do you know a single instance 
of a paging transmitter creating a problem 
other than the one Nr. Williams Jescr1beJ? 
A I must go by your specifications. 
You are required to meet a minus sixty-five 
DB in harmonic attenuation, and that's the 
limit according to specifications. riti:ens 
hand tranSTIJi tters must n1eet the same thing." 
Further, it is evident from the testimony of the Respondents' 
experts that there is a serious question about Appellant's con-
tention that this is t!1c -T:·c :In•i only site in Cache Valley. The 
Court made such a determination under it's statutory mandate in 
Section 78-34-4 (2) and 78-.34-8 (l), UCA. Appellant claims that 
the testimony of Respondents' experts was mere speculation, and 
yet these experts have vast experience in the area of radio and 
electronic emissions and radiation from the sume. (See T 229-
230, lines 14-9, T 282-283.) The fact that these experts have 
not worked with this particular brand of equipment does not alter 
the electronic principles or effects. Appellant completely 
ignores the fact that Cache Valley is in fringe area fur 1V 
reception where interference can be much more or the problem 
than in the Salt Lake City, Ogden and Pro\'ll areas, which arc 
class-A reception areas. All testimony or i\ppellant 
as to its assurances that there lHJuld be no interference, at 
least no interference they couldn't correct, was pure speculation 
inasmuch as they have hac.! no experience with their equipment in 
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the very different environment of Cache County. 
The Court, at this point 1 his respectfully referred to 
Respondents' Point I, supra, for the argument contained there 
as it goes to this particular issue as well. 
POINT V. THE FEDERAL cmH.l!lNICATJONS (OH!!ISSION 
REGULATLS '!'FIE ASSIGNING OF RADIO FREQUHICIES, LICEN-
SES AND CQ}Il'lON CARRIERS AND PERFORI,!S THE Ft'NCTim!S 
ASSIGNED TO IT BY CONGRESS. 
These Respondents acknowledge that the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC hereafter) regulates the assigning of radio 
frequencies, licenses common carriers, and performs the functions 
assigned to it by Congress, i.e.: 
" ... to make available so far as possible 
to all the people of the United States a rapid, 
efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire and 
radio communication service with adequate facil-
ities at reasonable charges ... " 
(See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 USC 151.) This 
includes, of course, a duty to monitor and allocate among the variou 
states, and cities and counties thereof, the use of the airwaves 
pursuant to the broad mandate set forth above. 
Based upon an examination of said act, the references 
thereto in legal treatises and the federal cases cited by Appel-
Jant in its brief, these Respondents are unable to find any 
references to the effect that the rcc is to be involved exclusively 
in the approval or disapproval of base station site locations, 
or that the J'CC: is to be involved at all. A reading of Section 
319 (a) or said Act relating to construction permits and licenses 
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for operation appears to indicate that it is the responsibility 
of the individual licensee to obtain a site and then notify 
the FCC of its location u.nd ownership as a part o[ the applic::~tion 
for a construction permit. Additionally, respondent' could 
not find any law to the effect that the FCC is concerned with, 
regulates or investigates complaints of the type to be expected 
from residents who e2::perience the interference with their 
television sets foreseen by Respondents' experts, caused by 
the operation c' ~'- _ L1Ilt 's transmitters on the proposed 
site and within 2n ~ppraximate area of one-half mile therefrom. 
This was a further basis of the trial courts decision and a 
point not addressed by Appellant in Point IV of its brief. 
With respect to Appellant's claim that the FCC, exclusively, 
approves or disapproves base station site locations; Respondents 
submit that Appellant has excised certain broad statements 
from the cases cited in Point IV o[ its brief and attempted 
to extend their coveru.ge and import for beyond that intended 
by the courts. It would be impractical and very burdensome 
if the FCC's involvement in local base station site locu.tions, 
except on rare occasion, were to extend beyond approving their 
general geographic location by state, county, or even city. 
None of the authorities cited by Appellant specifically deal with 
this problem, and it is not legally or practically sound to 
extend the isolated statements by the Courts, considering 
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the tremendous impact OJ so doing to the point of saying that 
the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction in approving the exact loca-
tion of each transmitting base station. To do so would be to 
declare Section 78-34-8, UCA invalid insofar as it relates to 
all cases OJ this type. It appears to Respondents that much 
more is needed by way of legal authority before this Court should 
feel compelled to take such a step. Further, Appellant's state-
ments as to the exclusivity of the FCC's role in selecting site 
locations are undercut by Appellant's own acts in going to the 
Utah Public Service Commission for a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity in order to locate and operate in the Cache County 
area. Then, on page 27 of its brief, near the bottom, Appellant 
seems to say that such deterreinations are exclusively the domain 
of the FCC or the Utah Public Services Commission. Such a state-
ment is not reconcilable with Appellant's earlier statements. 
The fact is that state and federal authorities must work hand 
in hand each operating in their own particular sphere of authority, 
in order to produce a workable regulation system for airwaves 
over our country. 
The trial court is charged by law, as set forth in previous 
arguments herein, to determine the conditions precedent to allow-
ing Appellant to exercise the power of eminant domain. It in 
no way interfered with the mandate given to the FCC to regulate 
the use of the airwaves, to allow the trial court to carry out 
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its said duty. The trial court dealt with frequencies and 
interferences only insofar as was necessary to determine if the 
taking of this particular site was necessary to Appellant's pro-
posed use. The trial court did not order Appellant to use a 
new frequency nor deny Appellant the right to operate in the pro-
posed service area. It merely determined that the proposed taking 
was not necessary, based upon evidence equally or more competent 
than Appellant 1 s. Cln the one hand, Respondents' 1vi tnesses 
may have had no experi~nce with Appellant's specific equipment, 
but had many years eyo~r.c~c2 in dealing with the principles 
upon which the equipment operates. On the other hand, Appellant's 
equipment is no where located next to a television receiver 
receiving and transmitting Channel 6 from Pocatello, Idaho 
Appellant's witnesses had no experience in dealing with their 
equipment in the specific environs of Cache Valley, a fringe 
television receiption area at best, Appellant's witnesses adwitted. 
they had performed no actual and legal tests whatsoever in Cache 
Valley which Respondents' witnesses said they would and should 
have, and said witnesses both admitted that their selection o[ 
this particular site was purely subjective. 
Respondents readily concede that the trial judge was not an 
expert in the fields or radio and televisi()n electronics :1nd 
communications. Respondents submit, however, that the case 
reporters are replete with cases in which the trial j ml~:e or 
other fact finder must be educated bv the p~11'ty~' 1v1 tncsscs, 
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who are experts in the subject matter of the lawsuits, before a 
decision can be reached. T~e process of receiving the evidence, 
digesting it, weighing it and finally making a determination is 
often long and difficult, but because such is the case is no 
reason to remove the decision from the proper and legally con-
stituted finder of fact. 
Finally, Appellant raises for the first time, on appeal, 
these specific allegations of error to the effect that the 
trial court erred in receiving evidence as to the necessity 
Appellant has for this site and ruling that other sites were 
available, and to the effect that the ~CC is the exclusive 
agency for determining local base site locations. As previously 
pointed out, Appellant has readily agreed that the necessity 
of this particular site as opposed to alternatives was the 
very issue the court was to decide. (See Point I above.) 
Appellant should not now be allowed to raise the issue after 
it was decided adversely to its interests. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in finding that Appellant under Utah 
law had the right to exercise the power of eminent domain in the 
manner attempted. This court should so hold until the legis-
lature grants specific authority to condemn for the particular 
purpose Appellant has stated it requires the property. 
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its said duty. The trial court dealt wlth frequencies and 
interferences only insofar as was necessary to determine if the 
taking of this particular site was necessary to Appellant's pro-
posed use. The trial court did not order Appellant to use a 
new frequency nor deny Appellant the right to operate in the pro-
posed service area. It merely determined that the proposed taking 
was not necessary, based upon evidence equally or more competent 
than Appellant 1 s. (In the one hand, Respondents 1 witnesses 
may have had no experience with Appellant's specific equipment, 
but had many years experience in dealing with the principles 
upon which the equipJ. -r:~ates. Cln the other hand, Appellant's 
equipment is no where located next to a television receiver 
receiving and transmitting Channel 6 from Pocatello, Idaho 
Appellant's witnesses had no experience 1n dealing with their 
equipment in the specific environs of Cache \'alley, a fringe 
television receiption area at best, Appellant's witnesses ad~itted. 
they had performed no actual and legal tests whatsoever in Cache 
Valley which Respondents' witnesses said they would and should 
have, and said witnesses both admitted that their selection of 
this particular site was purely subjective. 
Respondents readily concede that the trial judge was not an 
expert in the fields o[ radio and television electronic~ and 
communications. Respondents submit, however, that the case 
reporters are replete with cases in which the triil1 jud;;e or 
other fact finder must be educated bv the pilrtvs' witnessc~, 
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who are experts in the subject matter of the lawsuits, before a 
decision can be reached. The process of receiving the evidence, 
digesting it, weighing it and finally making a determination is 
often long and difficult, but because such is the case is no 
reason to remove the decision from the proper and legally con-
stituted finder of fact. 
finally, Appellant raises for the first time, on appeal, 
these specific allegations of error to the effect that the 
trial court erred in receiving evidence as to the necessity 
Appellant has for this site and rulin~ that other sites were 
availilble, and to the effect that the rcc is the exclusive 
agency for determining local base site locations. As previously 
pointed out, Appellant has readily agreed that the necessity 
of this particular site as opposed to alternatives was the 
very issue the court was to decide. (See Point I above.) 
. Appellant should not now be allowed to raise the issue after 
it was decided adversely to its interests. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in finding that Appellant under Utah 
law had the right to exercise the power of eminent domain in the 
manner attempted. This court should so hold until the legis-
lature grants specific authority to condemn for the particular 
purpose Appellant tas stated it r~quires the property. 
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The trial covrt \vas correct, ho~Vevcr, in detennintn:• that 
Appellant's right to condemn this particular site slwuld he 
denied because of the serious likL·l llwod tltat 1\ppcllatlt 's trans-
mitters will interfere with the Repondents' use of their 
property and 1vould very likely cause Respondents great ~1nLl 
irreparable damage if inst<~lleJ where requested; The trial 
court was correct in determining that several other :llternative 
sites would perform the same service for ,\ppellant and th:1.t 
the Intervenor-Respondent hacl standing to enter the del"ensc 
of this law suir '-~ t:rial court was also correct in receiving 
evidence anci detcl·n:',,t,,:• the S]Jecific issues hcC(JtC 1t tJtastnuch 
as it was legisla t i v•'ly m~1ncla ted tu do su. 
clearly supports the decision made by the trial court with 
respect to the points just listed and was coi·rcct in entering 
a Judgment dismissing Appellant's Cun;pla 1nt. 
Di\TFD this 12th clay o [ February, l ~179. 
1\ISPrCTFlJLLY :;up,~! I TfFJl 
!1!\RI< IS, I'Fl ST11N /1 r:rrn: I 
/s/ B. II. li:nris 
~-~-~-. JG r r 1 ~-- - -~- -
i\ttorneys Cor Jle 1 cndant-
l'.cspnndcnt 
31 l'c<.lcral !\venue· 
Logan, Ut:1.h M~~21 
Telephone: 7S2-3SSJ 
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0LSON, IIOGGI\N I; SflRU!SON 
/s/ L. llrent lloggan 
~~-----------------
/s/ llrucc L. J~~nse~n ____________ _ 
L. Brent !loggan and 
Bruce L. Juruensen 
Attorneys fo; Intervenor-
Respondent 
56 West Center 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 752-lSSl 
CFRTIFICATE OF SERVTCf: 
I hereby certify that I mailed three copies of the within 
Joint Brief of Defendant-Intervenor Respondents and Cross-
Appellants to Walter P. Faber, Jr. and David Lloyd, Attorneys 
for Plaintiff-Appellant, 606 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this 12th day of February, 1979. 
/s/ llruce L. Jorgensen 
Bruce L. Jorgensen 
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